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Abstract
Attention abilities rest on the coordinated interplay of multiple components. One
consequence to this multifaceted account is that selection processes likely
intersect with perception at various junctures. Drawing from this overarching view,
the current research examines how different forms of visuospatial attention
influence various aspects of conscious perception, including signal detection,
signal discrimination, visual awareness, and metacognition. In this effort, we
combined a double spatial cueing approach, where stimulus- and goal-driven
orienting were concurrently engaged via separate cues, with type 1 and type 2
signal detection theoretic frameworks through five experiments. Consistent with
the modular view of visuospatial attention, our comprehensive assessment reveals
that stimulus- and goal-driven orienting operate independently of each other for
increasing perceptual sensitivity and reducing the decision bound. Conversely,
however, our study shows that both forms of orienting hardly influence visual
awareness and metacognition once perceptual sensitivity is accounted for. Our
results therefore undermine the idea that attention directly interfaces with
subjective aspects of perception. Instead, our findings submit a general framework
whereby these attention modules indirectly impact visual awareness and
metacognition by increasing perceptual evidence and decreasing the decision
bound.
Significance Statement
While most scientists agree that attention is not a unitary construct, few theories
consider how different components of attention operate alongside each other to
shape how we perceive the world. Addressing this shortcoming, the present work
provides a comprehensive assessment of the combined influence of voluntary and
involuntary orienting of attention on conscious perception. Our results show that
both forms of attention operate independently of each other to improve perception
and mitigate biases during perceptual decision making. In turn, however, we found
that attention hardly influences subjective aspects of perception like visual
awareness and metacognition. This outcome challenges the idea that attention
shares an intimate relationship with consciousness.
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1

Introduction

2

Attention reflects the ability to select relevant information from our cluttered

3

environments (Nobre & Kastner, 2014). The need for this selection process arises

4

from important resources limitations that make it impossible for the brain to fully

5

process the barrage of sensory events it constantly encounters. Attention therefore

6

promotes well-adapted behaviors by filtering out irrelevant inputs and boosting

7

relevant ones (Carrasco, 2011). A key tenet that emerges from the extensive

8

literature on this cognitive ability is that selection does not correspond to a unitary

9

process, but instead emerges from the coordinated interplay of multiple functional

10

systems (Awh et al., 2012; Chica et al., 2013; Chun et al., 2011; Corbetta et al.,

11

2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Knudsen, 2007; Luo & Maunsell, 2018; Petersen

12

& Posner, 2012; Posner & Petersen, 1990; Raz & Buhle, 2006; Wright & Ward,

13

2008). The capacity to select relevant information therefore comprises multiple

14

components (Fan et al., 2002; Petersen & Posner, 2012; Posner & Petersen, 1990;

15

Raz & Buhle, 2006). This multifaceted view of attention aligns with the emerging

16

field of connectomics, wherein researchers advocate for the idea that the brain is

17

fundamentally organized into anatomical and functional subcomponents (Bullmore

18

& Sporns, 2009; Sporns, 2011, 2013a, 2013b). The ability to select sensory inputs

19

and discard others rests on several such neural systems (Petersen & Posner,

20

2012). Mounting evidence emphasizes the importance of construing attention in

21

light of this complexity to better understand how it shapes perception (Carrasco et

22

al., 2004; Chica & Bartolomeo, 2012; Chica et al., 2016; Chica, Botta, et al., 2012;

23

Chica et al., 2010; Chica, Paz-Alonso, et al., 2012; Colás et al., 2018; Kusnir et al.,

24

2011). In sum, the notion that attention divides into functional units is paramount

25

for elucidating the brain’s capacity to efficiently select relevant information.

26
27

Drawing from this general framework, the present collection of experiments

28

evaluates this multifaceted account across different aspects of perception,

29

including

30

metacognition. Our goal is to evaluate how distinct functional systems of

31

visuospatial attention – namely stimulus- and goal-driven orienting – intersect with

signal

detection

and

discrimination,

visual

awareness,

and
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32

these components of perception. Our study builds from ongoing efforts to uncover

33

the dynamics that characterizes these different forms of attention (Belopolsky et

34

al., 2010; Berger et al., 2005; Blair & Ristic, 2018; Chica et al., 2013; Chica, Botta,

35

et al., 2012; Chica et al., 2006; Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Folk & Remington, 1999;

36

Folk et al., 1992; Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002; Leber & Egeth, 2006; Ogawa &

37

Komatsu, 2004; Ristic & Kingstone, 2006, 2012; Ristic & Landry, 2015; Ristic et

38

al., 2012; Schreij et al., 2008; Theeuwes, 2004, 2010; Yantis & Jonides, 1990).

39

Our approach leverages type 1 and type 2 signal detection theory (SDT) across

40

target detection and discrimination tasks to provide a comprehensive account of

41

the influence of stimulus- and goal-driven orienting on conscious perception.

42
43

Stimulus- versus Goal-driven Attention

44

Researchers often characterize visuospatial attention as a dichotomy,

45

where stimulus-driven attention corresponds to involuntary orienting responses

46

following a salient event and goal-driven attention reflects voluntary shifts of

47

attention resources (Jonides, 1981; Posner, 1980). In the lab, both forms of

48

orienting are often operationalized through the spatial cueing paradigm - an

49

experimental approach based on attentional cues that precede the onset of a target

50

event and where the features of the cue determines the orienting response (Chica

51

et al., 2014). Previous work establishes that presenting salient cues at the

52

periphery of the visual field elicits stimulus-driven attention, even when the cues

53

are made non-informative about the target’s potential location (Schreij et al., 2008).

54

Salient events therefore trigger an orienting response despite being task-irrelevant,

55

a fact which alludes to the automaticity of stimulus-driven attention. In contrast,

56

informative symbolic cues presented centrally yield goal-driven responses as

57

participants voluntarily guide their attention based on the information conveyed by

58

the cue (Olk et al., 2014). This experimental procedure enables researchers to

59

study each orienting system separately by varying cue features. Critically, this

60

paradigm operationalizes attention processing by comparing cued and uncued

61

trials, which highlights the perceptual gain of visuospatial orienting through

3

62

facilitation effects and heightened sensory responses (Jonides, 1981; Luck et al.,

63

2000; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Posner, 1980).

64
65

The characterization of stimulus- and goal-driven attention thrives primarily

66

on distinct modes of control between involuntary versus voluntary orienting,

67

respectively. This dichotomy brings about the possibility to frame stimulus- and

68

goal-driven orienting as separate functional modules of visuospatial attention. The

69

notion of modularity refers to the emergence of components that exhibit a high

70

degree of differentiation along various dimensions within complex systems (Barrett

71

& Kurzban, 2006; Newman, 2006). Consistent with this notion, the modular view

72

of visuospatial attention draws upon a large body of findings that emphasize pivotal

73

functional differences between stimulus- and goal-driven orienting (Chica et al.,

74

2013). Modularity therefore supplies researchers with a useful framework to

75

understand their dynamics, both from a psychological and a neuroscientific

76

perspective, while keeping in mind that stimulus- and goal-driven attention perform

77

the same function, namely the selection of relevant information. One important

78

distinction between them concerns their respective temporal profiles, wherein

79

stimulus-driven orienting deploys and disengages rapidly, while goal-driven

80

orienting emerges gradually and exhibit the capacity to stay engaged for an

81

extended period of time (Müller & Rabbitt, 1989). These contrasting temporal

82

profiles match the quick reflexive responses of stimulus-driven attention on the one

83

hand, and the slower more deliberate shifts of goal-driven attention on the other

84

(Egeth & Yantis, 1997). Another important difference pertains to the interference

85

of secondary information processing on goal-driven attention (Jonides, 1981) – a

86

feature that reflects resource limitation during the voluntary control of attention

87

(Buschman & Kastner, 2015; Katsuki & Constantinidis, 2014; Knudsen, 2007;

88

Noudoost et al., 2010). Critically, a different kind of resource limitation has been

89

found to impair stimulus-driven attention (Lavie et al., 2004). Likewise, some

90

findings show a double dissociation between the effects of stimulus- and goal-

91

driven cueing, which serves to further underline the divide between them (Funes

92

et al., 2007). Altogether, a large body of research supports the idea that both forms

4

93

of orienting correspond to distinct functional modules that operate through

94

separate means (for a review, see Chica et al., 2013).

95
96

Questions that follow from this dichotomy concern the levels of

97

independence, cooperation, and interference between these orienting modules.

98

Despite compelling evidence about their functional differences, some findings

99

highlight circumstances where the modularity of visuospatial attention breaks down

100

(Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Hopfinger & West, 2006; Ruz & Lupiáñez, 2002). Along

101

those lines, the contingent capture hypothesis posits that stimulus-driven attention

102

rests on top-down processes and that task sets determine the emergence of the

103

reflexive orienting response (Folk & Remington, 1999; Folk et al., 1992).

104

Proponents of this viewpoint accordingly argue that salient events only elicit

105

stimulus-driven responses when they harmonize with the overarching goals and

106

intentions of individuals. In other words, mental processes typically linked to goal-

107

driven orienting are made critical for the emergence of stimulus-driven orienting.

108

In the same vein, some reports indicate that factors pertaining to goal-driven

109

orienting modulate the capture of stimulus-driven attention via salient events

110

(Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Theeuwes, 1991; Yantis & Jonides, 1990). Note that other

111

work submits opposing results and instead argues that stimulus-driven orienting

112

rests solely on the automatic capture of attention resources (Theeuwes, 1992,

113

2004). Beyond these ongoing debates about the role of top-down factors in

114

stimulus-driven orienting, the literature highlights instances where these different

115

forms of attention orienting interact with one another, along their temporal

116

dynamics (Grubb et al., 2015; Hopfinger & West, 2006) or in context of greater task

117

difficulty (Berger et al., 2005). These findings demonstrate that certain

118

experimental contexts can weaken the functional modularity of visuospatial

119

orienting, which raises important questions about their dynamics.

120
121

The double cueing experimental approach tackles this line of inquiry by

122

engaging both attention systems concurrently - each via a different cue (Berger et

123

al., 2005). In this way, a peripheral abrupt onset engages stimulus-driven orienting,
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124

while a concomitant central symbolic cue prompts goal-driven orienting (see Figure

125

1). Relying on different cues allows for comparisons of isolated and joint effects of

126

these orienting systems, and ultimately assess their interaction. The current study

127

rests on this experimental strategy to investigate the dynamics of stimulus- and

128

goal-driven attention across different facets of conscious perception. Our approach

129

further rests on type 1 and type 2 SDT to ascertain these patterns. This analytical

130

framework proceeds from two sorts of measure (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Macmillan

131

& Creelman, 2005; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012, 2014): (1) An objective response,

132

coined type 1 response, to assess task performance during detection,

133

discrimination or identification of a target stimulus; and (2) subjective judgments of

134

perception, labelled type 2 response, where participants report certain aspects of

135

their phenomenology with respect to perception based on their introspection

136

(Timmermans & Cleeremans, 2015). SDT represents a formidable tool for

137

examining type 1 and type 2 responses because it allows for the estimation of

138

perceptual and introspective sensitivity (i.e., the relationship of signal to noise)

139

independently from response biases (i.e., liberal or conservative stance with

140

respect to the amount of evidence that underlie responses tendencies). In this

141

fashion, while d’ estimates perceptual sensitivity, meta-d’ corresponds to

142

introspective sensitivity in terms of type 1 sensitivity parameter that would lead to

143

the observed type 2 responses assuming that the observer uses the same

144

information for producing type 1 and type 2 responses. In other words, meta-d’

145

reflects the degree to which subjective judgments predict task performance

146

independently from biases. Previous work highlights the reliability of this approach

147

for accurately gauging introspective access to internal information by comparing

148

meta-d’ to d’ since both estimates rest on the same scale; this comparison

149

produces an index called M-Ratio (Barrett et al., 2013). Thus, when the meta-d’

150

over d ratio (i.e., M-Ratio) equals 1, the model indicates that individuals make

151

optimal use of perceptual sensitivity (i.e., d’) to make subjective judgments. This

152

approach also provides an estimation of response bias and subjective uncertainty

153

based on type 1 and type 2 criteria, respectively. Hence, researchers can

154

determine whether performance and subjective judgments result from changes in

6

155

sensitivity or some form response bias. d’ and meta-d’ typically correlate positively,

156

which implies that perceptual evidence impacts introspective sensitivity in a

157

manner that allows individuals to make use of the information available to form

158

their subjective judgments (e.g., Kepecs et al., 2008). However, despite the strong

159

bond between perceptual and introspective sensitivities, previous work highlights

160

experimental conditions where we can observe a dissociation between them (e.g.,

161

Lau & Passingham, 2006; however, see Peters & Lau, 2015). This dissociation

162

suggests that type 1 and type 2 responses follow from distinct processes, rather

163

than a single channel (Maniscalco & Lau, 2016; Rausch et al., 2018; Rausch &

164

Zehetleitner, 2017). The present study proceeds from this framework to examine

165

whether stimulus- and goal-driven orienting modulates these different components

166

of perception and tests whether we can observe a similar dissociation as a function

167

of visuospatial attention. Furthermore, our experiment will determine whether both

168

forms of orienting operate independently or interactively at these levels of

169

perceptual processing. Our experimental approach additionally uses a masking

170

procedure so as to avoid floor and ceiling effects (Breitmeyer & Ögmen, 2006).

171
172

Our study addresses ongoing disputes regarding the role of attention in

173

consciousness (Montemayor & Haladjian, 2015). Based on the SDT framework, a

174

large body of research confirms the impacts on stimulus- and goal-driven attention

175

on perceptual evidence and the decision bound (Carrasco, 2011; Hawkins et al.,

176

1990; Luo & Maunsell, 2018; Rahnev et al., 2011). In turn, however, there is some

177

contention in the field as to whether attention directly influences the subjective level

178

of perception. Given the strong link between perceptual and introspective

179

sensitivities, the influence of attention on the former likely impacts the latter. Still,

180

the current study aims to determine whether attention enhances the subjective

181

component of perception beyond that of task performance. Type 2 SDT is designed

182

to tackle this inquiry, whereby the observation that stimulus- and goal-driven

183

attention increases M-Ratio would imply that these forms of orienting directly

184

interface with subjective components of perception.

185
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186

The idea that attention is a prerequisite to conscious perception is quite

187

prevalent (Cohen et al., 2012; De Brigard & Prinz, 2010; Dehaene et al., 2006;

188

O'Regan & Noë, 2001; Posner, 1994, 2012). This view mainly follows from

189

evidence showing that individuals typically remain unaware of unattended events

190

(Jensen et al., 2011; Mack, 2003; Mack & Rock, 1998; Most, 2010, 2013; Most et

191

al., 2005; Most et al., 2000; Raymond et al., 1992; Shapiro et al., 1997; Simons,

192

2000; Simons & Chabris, 1999; Simons & Levin, 1997). In contrast, certain findings

193

intimate that attention and awareness reflect orthogonal processes (Brascamp et

194

al., 2010; Koch & Tsuchiya, 2007; van Boxtel, 2017; van Boxtel et al., 2010a; van

195

Boxtel et al., 2010b; Watanabe et al., 2011; Wyart et al., 2012; Wyart & Tallon-

196

Baudry, 2008). Thus far, evidence from the spatial cueing procedure remains

197

agnostic relative to these ongoing disputes. While some studies argue favorably

198

for the primacy of goal-driven orienting (Kurtz et al., 2017; Vernet et al., 2019;

199

Zizlsperger et al., 2012), others instead promote the centrality of stimulus-driven

200

orienting (Chica, Botta, et al., 2012; Chica et al., 2011; Chica et al., 2010), or even

201

favor both forms of orienting (Hsu et al., 2011). Conversely, some studies report

202

that attention hardly influence subjective reports of perception beyond task

203

performance and therefore undermine the attention view of consciousness

204

(Wilimzig et al., 2008; Wyart et al., 2012; Wyart & Tallon-Baudry, 2008).

205

Methodological and analytical differences likely account for this heterogeneous

206

landscape. In particular, few assays control for potential biases that might plague

207

type 2 responses. Thus, variations in subjective reports following visuospatial

208

attention could in fact result from variations of the decision bound (Peters et al.,

209

2016). Previous work strongly alludes to this possibility (Rahnev et al., 2011). The

210

present work proceeds from these disputes and aims to overcome ambivalence

211

regarding the influence of stimulus- and goal-driven attention employing the double

212

cueing approach to tease apart the respective influence of each orienting form,

213

while also addressing caveats relative to response biases using type 2 SDT.

214
215

Experimental Predictions
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216

Our overarching goal is to evaluate the modularity of stimulus- and goal-

217

driven orienting across objective and subjective dimensions of perception. In this

218

way, a statistically reliable interaction between both forms of orienting would

219

specify that the combined synergy between them differs from the sum of their

220

isolated effects - a pattern that would reflect a breakdown of modularity.

221

Conversely, the absence of an interaction would support the modular view of

222

visuospatial attention by promoting that the combined effect of stimulus- and goal-

223

driven attention likely corresponds to the sum of their isolated effect. Note that

224

these interpretations assume that main effects for each form of orienting are

225

statistically reliable.

226
227

Experiment 1 and 2

228

Methods

229

Participants. We recruited 28 and 37 participants for our first and second

230

experiment, respectively. Each participant reported normal or corrected-to-normal

231

vision. They received monetary compensation of $10/hour CAD for two two-hour

232

sessions of 1536 trials each. Participants completed both sessions on different

233

days. Each session comprised 8 blocks of 192 trials. Before each session,

234

participants completed a series of 10 practice trials until they confirmed

235

understanding the task. All procedures were approved by the local ethics review

236

board.

237
238

We reasoned that sample size estimations should be considered in light of

239

the effects of stimulus- and goal-driven attention on perceptual sensitivity. Thus, in

240

order to properly examine our hypotheses, we determined that the sample should

241

allow for perceptual facilitation to occur following both stimulus- and goal-driven

242

spatial cueing. However, in the near absence of specific information regarding the

243

effect size estimates for our methodology, we considered experiment 1 to be

244

exploratory and based our sample size on previous experiments (see the following

245

report for effect size estimations; Chica et al., 2014). Here, we conducted apriori

246

power analyses for repeated measures F-tests on cueing effects for response
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247

times in the context of target discrimination tasks using G*Power3 (Faul et al.,

248

2007). Our goal was to determine the sample size for facilitation effects of stimulus-

249

and goal-driven orienting. At long cue-target latencies (i.e., > 500ms), a central

250

predictive cue merely requires 6 participants to achieve a power of .8 following the

251

large effect size observed in previous work (η2 = .34) and an alpha of .05. Likewise,

252

at short cue-target latencies (i.e., < 300ms), a peripheral non-predictive cue only

253

requires 3 participants to achieve a power of .8 following a large effect size (η2 =

254

.84). Based on this information, and again to ensure proper evaluation of our

255

hypotheses, our recruitment for experiment 1 was four folds greater than our

256

estimations of goal-driven orienting and nine times greater than that of stimulus-

257

driven orienting (Chica et al., 2014).

258
259

We determined the sample size for experiment 2 from the results of

260

experiment 1 using hierarchical linear regression modelling through the lme4

261

package (Bates et al., 2015) and simulations from the SIMR package (Green &

262

MacLeod, 2016) in R Studio (RStudio-Team, 2020). Consistent with our previous

263

assessment, simulations revealed that 6 participants were required to achieve a

264

power of .8 relative to the effects of stimulus- and goal-driven attention on

265

discrimination performance when alpha was set to .05. In this regard, we observed

266

somewhat of a large effect size when fitting both effects, Marginal R2GLMM = .23.

267

(Barton & Barton, 2019; Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013). Having confirmed that the

268

sample size was reliable for detecting the effects of stimulus- and goal-driven

269

orienting, we opted for a sample size that would match that of experiment 1. Lastly,

270

we maximized power to better assess our hypotheses by pooling data from both

271

experiment 1 and 2. Note that our findings nevertheless replicated separately

272

across both experiments (see supplementary material).

273
274

Three participants were excluded in each experiment due to self-attrition.

275

We additionally excluded five participants from experiment 1 and ten from

276

experiment 2 based on the following criteria: Elevated (> 15%) rates of either

277

anticipation errors (Response Time < 150ms), timeout errors (Response Time >

10

278

1500ms), or wrong key pressed, as well as below chance performance (< 50%

279

accuracy), or implausible subjective report (e.g., 100% seen target). Specifically,

280

four exclusions followed from elevated anticipation errors and one due to

281

implausible number of seen target events in experiment 1. In turn, all ten excluded

282

participants from experiment 2 showed elevated anticipation errors. Three of those

283

individuals already excluded due to anticipation errors also showed elevated

284

numbers of wrong key presses and poor discrimination accuracy. 20 participants

285

(15 adult females; age: M = 21 y.o., SD = 1.23) were kept for experiment 1 and 24

286

(15 adult females; age: M = 20.54 y.o., SD = 2.36) for experiment 2. We deemed

287

it important to remove time out errors because these responses potentially involve

288

additional perceptual processing that may hurt the generalizability of our findings.

289

The elevated number of exclusions we report here pose a threat to future

290

replications. In this regard, a few participants reported that the task was particularly

291

tedious, which could explain the pattern we observed with respect to exclusion.

292
293

Apparatus and Stimuli. All participants viewed the task on a 17.5-in CRT monitor

294

(ViewSonic Graphics Series G90fB) sitting approximately 60 cm away. We used

295

Psychtoolbox-3 and MATLAB (Mathworks inc. version R2015a) to display the

296

stimuli. The screen was set to 85hz. All stimuli were made from black lines (i.e.,

297

RGB values of 0, 0, 0; 1.0 cd/m2) against a grey background (i.e., RGB values of

298

128, 128, 128; 21.8 cd/m2) except for the target gratings. The targets were circular

299

gratings (i.e., 3° of visual angle) of alternating parallel lines (3 cpd) of black (RGB

300

values of 0, 0, 0) and white (RGB values of 255, 255, 255; 158.3 cd/m 2) with a

301

oriented clockwise or counter-clockwise, wherein the orientation of the targets

302

ranged from 15° to 30° in steps of 5° degrees. However, the current analyses did

303

not include this factor. All four target locations were marked by boxes subtending

304

3° of visual angles, each situated 3° of visual angle away from fixation at one of

305

the four cardinal points. Arabic numbers “1”, “3”, “6” and “9” (i.e., 2° by 1.5° of visual

306

angles) served as cues for goal driven attention. Note that symbolic number cues

307

do not elicit a pure form of goal-driven orienting. This limitation follows from prior

308

knowledge of numerical concepts and their relation to spatial representations

11

309

where numbers can prompt automatic orienting responses consistent with the

310

number line or the spatial location of numbers within clocks (e.g., the number 6

311

situated at the bottom of the clock; Ristic et al., 2006). It seems reasonable to

312

assume that such numerical prior knowledge contributed to the orienting response

313

here. We nevertheless opted for this option to engage goal-driven attention given

314

the difficulty of the task, as the number cues were easier to process with respect

315

to four target locations. Conversely, we cued stimulus-driven attention by briefly

316

changing the line drawing from one of the placeholders to white. The backwards

317

mask consisted of checkerboard patterns comprising 10 by 10 white and black

318

squares, each mask subtended 2° visual angle.

319
320

Design. Participants viewed both cues on each trial, which entails that goal-driven

321

and stimulus-driven attention systems were engaged throughout the experiment.

322

Consistent with previous studies relying on a double cueing approach (see Figure

323

1), we presented goal-driven and stimulus-driven cues at different latencies,

324

wherein the target would onset within a time-window corresponding to the maximal

325

efficiency of each system (Chica et al., 2014). Number cues were predictive of the

326

target’s location, whereby the number “1” indicated that the target was 62.5% likely

327

to onset at the top location, the number “3” indicated that the target was 62.5%

328

likely to onset rightward, the number “6” indicated that the target was 62.5% likely

329

to onset to the bottom location, the number “9” indicated that the target was 62.5%

330

likely to onset leftward. The number cues were therefore task-relevant. To ensure

331

that this peripheral cue solely engaged stimulus-driven attention, the cue-target

332

spatial contingency was set to 25%, such that the cue was not predictive of the

333

target’s location. The experimenter informed participants about cue-target

334

contingencies. Hence, participants were asked to guide their attention according

335

to the number cue, while discounting the peripheral cueing event.

336
337

Critically, given cueing contingencies, sometimes both cues would indicate

338

different target locations, other times the same location. Thus, the mixture of

339

cueing conditions and target locations produces a two-by-two factorial albeit
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340

imbalanced design, comprising stimulus-driven (i.e., valid versus invalid) and goal-

341

driven attention (i.e., valid versus invalid; see Figure 1). For both sessions, this

342

task comprised 864 trials where both cues were invalid, 288 trials where the

343

stimulus-driven cue was valid and the goal-driven cue was invalid, 1440 trials

344

where the stimulus-driven cue was invalid and the goal-driven cue was valid, and

345

480 trials where both cues were valid. Our approach also relied on two distinct

346

target-mask latencies to explore cueing effects across varying levels of signal

347

strengths. Cueing conditions and masking latency were mixed within blocks. Cue

348

direction and target position were equally spread across all four locations. For each

349

trial, participants were required to input a type 1 discrimination responses by

350

pressing the “F” key with their left index finger or “J” key with right index finger to

351

subsequently indicate the orientation of the target. Thereafter, participants also

352

specified a type 2 subjective report regarding target events pressing the “F” key

353

with their left index finger or “J” key with right index finger. While type 1 responses

354

were identical for both experiments, type 2 responses were different. For

355

experiment 1, participants indicated whether they consciously saw the target event

356

or not. Specifically, participants were explicitly instructed to indicate whether they

357

had a conscious experience of seeing the target event or not. For experiment 2,

358

they indicated whether they were confident about the response they just provided.

359

Input keys for “Seen” and “Unseen” options, as well as “Confident” and “Not

360

Confident”, were counterbalanced across participants.

361
362

Procedure. Every trial began with a fixation cross for 495ms, followed by the onset

363

of a goal-driven cue at the center with its latency randomly jittered between 396

364

and 495ms. The stimulus-driven cue would then onset and remained on the screen

365

for 99ms. The target appeared after a random variable delay from 0ms to 198ms.

366

We used a uniform distribution for random latencies. Therefore, the goal-driven

367

cue-target onset asynchrony varied between 495ms and 792ms, while the

368

stimulus-driven cue-target onset asynchrony varied between 99ms and 297ms.

369

The target would onset in one of the four target locations and was then

370

subsequently masked. Target-mask onset asynchrony were 22ms and 55ms. The
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371

goal-driven cue and mask remained on the screen for 1991ms or until the

372

participant inputted their discrimination responses relative to the target orientation.

373

Next, a screen prompted participants to provide their subjective responses. The

374

words “Seen” and “Unseen” for experiment 1, or “Confident” and “Not Confident”

375

for experiment 2, appeared for 2970ms or until the participant responded a second

376

time. The location of each word mapped onto the keys for the type 2 responses,

377

wherein leftward location corresponded to the “F” key and the rightward location

378

the “J” key. Participants were asked to fixate at the center of the screen throughout

379

the experiment and input both type 1 and type 2 responses as quickly and

380

accurately as possible.
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Figure 1. Experimental design. We used a two-by-two double cueing experimental approach across all five
experiments, involving stimulus-driven attention cueing (valid vs. invalid) by goal-driven attention cueing (valid
vs. invalid). A stimulus-driven and a goal-driven cue preceded the target event, while checkerboard pattern
masked all four target locations thereafter following 22ms or 55ms. See methods for detail. A. In Experiments
1 & 2, we instructed participants to discriminate the orientation of the grating target (i.e., clockwise vs.
counterclockwise). Next, we asked them to report visual awareness of the target event in Experiment 1 (i.e.,
seen vs. unseen), and confidence judgments about task performance in Experiment 2 (i.e., confident vs. not
confident). B. In Experiment 3, we again instructed participants to discriminate the orientation of the grating
target (i.e., clockwise vs. counterclockwise) and then provide confidence judgments about task performance.
Masking latency was fixed at 55ms. Note that we titrated the contrast value of the Gabor stimuli across
attention conditions following the QUEST algorithm. The purpose was to equate performance across attention
conditions, and then evaluate the direct influence of attention on confidence judgments following stimulus- and
goal-driven cueing C. In experiment 4 and 5, we combined the double cueing experimental approach with a
detection task, where the target event occurred for only half of the trials. The masking latency was set to 55ms
in Experiment 4, and then 22ms and 55ms in Experiment 5. We instructed participants to indicate whether a
target event had occurred (i.e., present vs. absent) at the probed location, wherein one of the masks turned
red to probe a specific location.

381

Analysis. We pooled type 1 responses from experiment 1 and experiment 2

382

together. Likewise, for type 2 responses. We opted for this approach because

383

results from each experiment separately were identical (see supplementary

384

material).

385
386

Discrimination Responses – Type 1 Responses - Signal Detection Theory. We

387

used signal detection theory to assess discrimination performance (Macmillan &

388

Creelman, 2005). For type 1 responses, estimations of perceptual sensitivity d’ and

389

decision criterion C is computed through a direct analytic solution:

390
391

d’ = z(hit rate) – z(false alarm)

392

C = -0.5 *(z(hit rate) + z(false alarm))

393
394

where z represents the inverse of the cumulative normal distribution. Note that in

395

simple target discrimination tasks the hit rate is defined as the correct response

396

when the corresponding stimulus is displayed on screen (e.g., responding

397

clockwise to clockwise stimulus), while false alarm rates is defined as the incorrect

398

response when the other stimulus is displayed (e.g., responding clockwise to

399

counterclockwise stimulus; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). We applied the

400

following correction ((2*N)-1)/(2*N), where N equals the number of trials, whenever

401

hit rate was equal to 1; and 1/(2*N) whenever false alarm was equal to 0

402

(Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Three percent of cells required such corrections.
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403

Inferential statistics were done through hierarchical regression modelling (Gelman

404

& Hill, 2006), as implemented by the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015) in R Studio

405

(RStudio-Team, 2016). Goodness-of-fit was determined in a stepwise fashion

406

using chi-square tests. We also informed model selection using Bayesian

407

information criterion (BIC). We estimated the effect size for the best fitting model

408

by calculating the marginal R2 using the MuMln R package (Barton & Barton, 2019;

409

Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013) We additionally evaluated the reliability of the null

410

hypothesis for the absence of an interaction between stimulus-driven and goal-

411

driven cue validity by estimating Bayes factor (i.e., Pr(data|H 0/Pr(data|H1)) using

412

the BIC (Wagenmakers, 2007) following the following equation:

413
414

BF01 = eΔBIC
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415
416

Subjective Judgements – Type 2 Responses – HMeta-d. We similarly relied on the

417

signal detection theoretic framework to assess type 2 responses in order to

418

estimate efficacy for subjective reports across attention conditions (Maniscalco &

419

Lau, 2012, 2014). However, contrary to type 1 SDT, the estimation of parameters

420

for type 2 SDT does not follow from a straightforward solution and instead requires

421

for researchers to fit estimates over the probability of being confident given a

422

stimuli events and discrimination responses. Here, we used HMeta-d, a MATLAB

423

toolbox (Mathworks inc. version R2017a; note that the toolbox is also available in

424

R) designed to estimate type 2 SDT parameters at the group-level, while taking

425

into account subject-level uncertainty, through the exploration of parameters

426

spaces via Bayesian statistics and Markov-Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) sampling

427

strategy as implemented in JAGS (Plummer), as well as given the specifications

428

of the model and the data (Fleming, 2017; https://github.com/metacoglab/HMeta-

429

d). This analytic approach provides statistical inference through Bayesian

430

computations of posterior densities that estimate parameters values for type 2

431

SDT, including type 2 responses efficiency, herein the log of M-Ratio (i.e., log

432

(meta-d’/d’)). Furthermore, we extended this analytic strategy to estimate

433

parameter values of linear regression models for examining how stimulus-driven
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434

attention, goal-driven attention, and their interaction predict log M-Ratio. We

435

included these beta parameters in a stepwise fashion through different models.

436

Note, however, that we performed this analysis separately for early (i.e., 22ms)

437

and late (i.e., 55ms) masking latency to avoid appending additional parameters

438

and hurting the interpretation due to the complexity of the models. This approach

439

was consistent with hypothesis for type 2 SDT and the influence of attention on

440

conscious perception. Although we compared the different models based on

441

deviance information criterion (DIC), we nevertheless examined the full models

442

across both masking latencies:

443
444

Log M-Ratio ~ β0 + β1[Stimulus-Driven cue validity] + β2[Goal-Driven cue validity]

445

+ β3[Stimulus-driven cue validity X Goal-driven cue validity]

446
447

Parameter estimation relied on 3 MCMC chains of 100,000 samples with burn-in

448

of 1000 samples and thinning of 10 samples, while using the standard prior values

449

from the toolbox. We evaluated convergence of the model by inspecting MCMC

450

chains and by ensuring that the Gelman-Rubin diagnostic metrics (R-hat) were

451

below 1.1 for all parameter estimations (Gelman & Rubin, 1992). We used the 95%

452

high-density interval (HDI) from the posterior samples to assess the parameter

453

estimates (Kruschke, 2015). We used the same approach to evaluate how

454

stimulus- and goal-driven orienting operate at the level of the Type 2 criteria (see

455

supplementary material).

456
457

Results

458

Objective performance (type 1 response) in experiment 1 and 2. Following the

459

target discrimination task, we computed SDT estimates for each participant across

460

the masking and attention conditions, and then relied on hierarchical linear

461

regression modelling to evaluate the influence of each experimental variable. Our

462

step-wise approach to determine the best fitting model first included masking

463

latency (i.e., early and late), then stimulus-driven attention (i.e., valid and invalid),
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464

followed by goal-driven attention (i.e., valid and invalid), as well as their interactions

465

as fixed factors, with subjects as random factors.

466
467

Our results are consistent with the modular view of visuospatial attention

468

where both stimulus- and goal-driven orienting influenced perceptual sensitivity

469

across both masking latencies yet did not interact (Figure 2). According to our

470

stepwise approach, the best fitting model (see Tables 1 and 2 in supplementary

471

material; Marginal R2GLMM = .46) conveys that masking latency (β = 0.82, SE =

472

0.11, 95% CI [0.61, 1.04]), stimulus-driven cue validity (β = 0.55, SE = 0.09, 95%

473

CI [0.38, 0.73]), goal-driven cue validity (β = 0.96, SE = 0.09, 95% CI [0.78, 1.13]),

474

and masking latency by goal-driven cue validity interaction (β = 0.31, SE = 0.13,

475

95% CI [0.06, 0.56]) represent reliable predictors. Thus, all three variables

476

improved discrimination performance, while the benefits of goal-driven increases

477

slightly for the longer masking latency. Critically, the full model comprising the

478

interactions between stimulus-driven cue validity and goal-driven cue validity, as

479

well as the three-way interaction between masking latency, stimulus-driven cue

480

validity, and goal-driven cue validity, failed to improve the fit of the data (χ 2 (2) =

481

1.67, p = 0.434). Here, the stimulus-driven cue validity by goal-driven cue validity

482

two-way interaction (β = -0.12, SE = 0.18, 95% CI [-0.47, 0.23]) and the masking

483

latency by stimulus-driven cue validity by goal-driven cue validity three-way

484

interaction (β = -0.07, SE = 0.25, 95% CI [-0.57, 0.42]) both proved statistically

485

unreliable predictors (see Figure 2). Evidence therefore indicates that stimulus-

486

and goal-driven orienting operate separately in boosting the perceptual signal. We

487

further evaluated this hypothesis by assessing evidence favoring the null

488

hypothesis (i.e., the best fitting model) versus the alternative hypothesis (i.e., the

489

best fitting model with the stimulus-driven by goal-driven two-way interaction, and

490

again with the three-way masking latency by stimulus-driven by goal-driven

491

interaction) using Bayes factors. This analytical strategy weights both hypotheses

492

against the data and provides additional information for interpreting null findings

493

(Aczel et al., 2018). Our results favored the null hypothesis in both cases, wherein

494

the analyses returned BF01 = 8.5 when we included the stimulus-driven by goal-
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495

driven two-way interaction in the alternative model, and BF01 = 10.23 when we

496

included the masking latency by stimulus-driven by goal-driven three-way

497

interaction in the alternative model. Note that we corroborated these results for

498

experiment 1 and 2 separately (see Tables 3 and 4 in supplementary material).

499

We similarly assessed the decision criterion parameter of the SDT model. The best

500

model solely involved masking latency as a predictor (see Tables 5 and 6 in

501

supplementary material; β = -0.06, SE = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.11, -0.004]; Marginal

502

R2GLMM = .003).

Figure 2. Type 1 signal detection analysis for the discrimination response in Experiment 1 and 2. A.
Averaged perceptual sensitivity estimates (d’) across stimulus- and goal-driven cueing through 22ms and
55ms masking latencies. B. We fitted hierarchical linear regression models to predict perceptual sensitivity
(d’) and therefore evaluate the effects of stimulus- and goal-driven attention, as well as masking latencies.
Here, we plot fixed effects β parameters of the full model. Error bars represent 95% CI.

503

Note that we also evaluated median correct response times and found no evidence

504

of a speed-accuracy tradeoff (see Supplementary Figure 1; Tables 7 and 8 in

505

supplementary material).

506
507

Subjective judgments (type 2 responses) for experiment 1 and 2. The assessment

508

of M-Ratio through hierarchical Bayesian modelling revealed the limited influence

509

of attention processing on subjective judgments of perception. Visual assessment

510

of the MCMC samples and Gelman-Rubin diagnostic (i.e., R-Hat < 1.1) confirmed

511

convergence of the models (see supplementary Figure 3). The DIC varied

512

marginally across models for both early and late masking latencies (Figure 3),

513

which entails that more complex models failed to improve the fit compared to the

514

baseline model (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). Here, we observe that the 95% HDI of
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515

the posterior densities for the beta estimates in the full models encompassed zero

516

across early and late masking latencies (Figure 3). For early mask latency, the

517

intercept of the model conveyed that the M-Ratio approximated 1 for the

518

unattended condition as (μ of β0 = 1.14, 95% HDI [.94 1.36]), which indicates that

519

participant based their subjective judgments on the perceptual information

520

available regardless of attention processing. Note that, since our attention

521

variables were dummy coded, the intercept estimates the M-Ratio at baseline (i.e.,

522

the unattended condition). Importantly, both stimulus-driven and goal-driven

523

attention failed to improve M-Ratio (μ of β1[Stimulus-Driven Cue Validity] = -.002,

524

95% HDI [-.263 .261]; μ of β2[Goal-Driven Cue Validity] = -.014, 95% HDI [-.225

525

.196]), while their interaction was also statistically unreliable (μ of β3[Stimulus-

526

Driven Cue Validity X Goal-Driven Cue Validity] = -.0195, 95% HDI [-.341 .281]).

527

We observed a similar pattern for the late masking latency, although participants

528

showed a marginal benefit of the M-Ratio at baseline (μ of β0 = 1.21, 95% HDI

529

[1.08 1.34]). Again, however, we observed that stimulus- and goal-driven orienting

530

failed to improved type 2 response sensitivity (μ of β1[Stimulus-Driven Cue Validity]

531

= .011, 95% HDI [-.145 .167]; μ of β2[Goal-Driven Cue Validity] = .096, 95% HDI [-

532

.035 .228]); and likewise for the interaction parameter (μ of β3[Stimulus-Driven Cue

533

Validity X Goal-Driven Cue Validity] = -.014, 95% HDI [-.211 .179]). Plotting the

534

corresponding estimated averaged M-Ratio per conditions across each participant

535

corroborated our assessment and revealed little variations across attention

536

conditions (see Figure 3). Note that we observe the same results for experiment 1

537

and experiment 2 separately (see supplementary Figures 4 and 5). Altogether, our

538

type 1 and type 2 SDT analyses demonstrate how visuospatial orienting of

539

attention fails to increase introspective sensitivity beyond that of perceptual

540

sensitivity, which implies that attention influences the subjective components of

541

perception through lower level processing. This outcome entails that the locus of

542

stimulus- and goal-driven orienting therefore appears limited to the perceptual level

543

of processing and that both forms of orienting indirectly interface with the subjective

544

level of perception. Note that stimulus- and goal-driven orienting, as well as their
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545

interaction, were also statistically unreliable for the type 2 criteria (see

546

supplementary Figures 6 and 7).

Figure 3. Type 2 signal detection analysis for subjective judgments in Experiment 1 and Experiment
2. A. Averaged values for estimated individual values for type 2 responses efficiency (i.e., M-Ratio) from
MCMC modelling across stimulus- and goal-driven cueing through 22ms and 55ms mask latencies. Error bars
represent bootstrapped 95% C.I. B. Deviance information criterion that corresponds to the four linear
regression models that were fitted to the data to estimate M-Ratio from Experiments 1 and 2 as a function of
stimulus- and goal-driven orienting. We fitted models separately for 22ms and 55ms masking latencies. C.
Posterior densities for parameter estimates of the full linear regression model for predicting type 2 responses
efficiency (i.e., M-Ratio) at 22ms masking latency. The dotted lines represent 95% HDI. D. Posterior densities
for parameter estimates of the full linear regression model for predicting type 2 responses efficiency (i.e., MRatio) at 55ms masking latency. The dotted lines represent 95% HDI.

547

The results from experiments 1 and 2 inform the current research in two

548

ways. First, our findings support the modular of visuospatial orienting by showing

549

that stimulus- and goal-driven orienting enhance perceptual sensitivity with limited

550

interaction. Both forms of orienting therefore parallel each other at this level of
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551

processing. Second, evidence did not support the idea that attention directly

552

interfaces with the subjective components of perception. However, both of these

553

interpretations rest on null hypotheses, which could raise concerns regarding type

554

2 error. Our approach has already addressed such worries here. In particular, we

555

observed that evidence supports our null hypotheses despite the reliable effects of

556

stimulus- and goal-driven attention on perceptual processing. Therefore, following

557

a-priori power analyses, the absence of evidence needs to be explained while both

558

forms of orienting clearly benefited perception. Furthermore, we should also

559

consider that we replicated these null results in each experiment individually (see

560

Supplementary Material). In other words, we combined data from both installments

561

to maximize power, but nevertheless observed the same pattern in experiment 1

562

and 2. Lastly, we evaluated whether evidence supports these null hypotheses

563

using Bayes statistics instead of solely relying on null hypothesis testing (Dienes,

564

2014; Gallistel, 2009; Wagenmakers, 2007). Here, lack of power would convey

565

some form of ambiguity. And yet, evidence clearly favored null hypotheses.

566

Altogether, our approach provides a solid basis for arguing in favor of null

567

hypotheses.

568
569

As mentioned in the introduction, one caveat that often besets the field of

570

consciousness studies pertains to the impact of task performance on subjective

571

reports (Irvine, 2013). The main issue is that, despite their strong bond, subjective

572

components of perception are distinct from task performance (Lau & Passingham,

573

2006; Weiskrantz, 1986), which emphasizes the need to delineate both processes

574

to precisely gauge changes in conscious perception independently from those of

575

task performance. The relative blindsight approach represents an experimental

576

strategy designed to remove the influence of performance on subjective judgments

577

across variables of interests (Lau & Passingham, 2006; Samaha, 2015). This

578

outcome is achieved by matching performances across conditions via a titration

579

procedure so that type 2 responses may vary while performance remains constant.

580

Hence, in contrast to type 2 SDT where variations of subjective judgements and

581

introspective sensitivity are isolated through analytical means, relative blindsight
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582

achieves the same goal via experimental means. We adopted this methodology in

583

our third experiment to corroborate our previous results, and thereby validate our

584

findings beyond type 2 SDT. Our goal was to replicate our findings about how

585

attention relates the subjective components of perception using the relative

586

blindsight approach and therefore corroborate our current interpretation.

587
588

Experiment 3

589

Method

590

Participants. We recruited 33 participants for the third experiment. They received

591

a monetary compensation of $10/hour CAD for two sessions of 1728 trials.

592

Participants completed both sessions on different days. Each session comprised

593

12 blocks of 144 trials. Participants completed a series of 10 practice trials until

594

they understood the task. Given that our objective was to replicate outcomes from

595

experiments 1 and 2, we aimed for a similar sample size.

596
597

Five participants were excluded due to elevated (> 15%) anticipation errors

598

(Response Time < 150ms). 28 participants (17 adult females; age: M = 22.44 y.o,

599

SD = 3.6) were included in this experiment.

600
601

Apparatus and Stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were similar to the first two

602

experiments, with the following exceptions (see Figure 1). All four target-

603

placeholders, as well as the masking stimulus, were changed from squares to

604

circles. We also switched the target stimulus from a circular grating to a Gabor

605

patch (i.e., a sinusoidal pattern combined with a Gaussian envelope) subtending

606

3° of visual angle, 3 cpd; while orientation was fixed to 15° or -15°. Moreover, the

607

purpose of this third experiment was to directly evaluate the effects of stimulus-

608

driven and goal-driven attention on subjective reports using the relative blindsight

609

approach where we control for task performance. We relied on the QUEST

610

algorithm to achieve this experimental strategy (Watson & Pelli, 1983), wherein the

611

Michelson contrast value of the Gabor target would vary as a function of attention
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612

conditions. Thus, we equalized type 1 response performance across the

613

unattended, stimulus-driven, goal-driven, and combined attention conditions.

614
615

Design & Procedure. The design and procedure were similar to previous

616

experiments, with the following exceptions. While we kept the reliability of the

617

peripheral cue at chance level (i.e., 25%), we made the central number cue

618

predictive of the target location at 50%. Due to our unbalanced trial matrix following

619

the combination of spatial cueing procedures, this modification allowed us to

620

increase the overall number of unattended and stimulus-driven trials. Our

621

instructions to participants emphasized the need to use the central number cue

622

regardless of its reliability. (Analyses confirm their compliance with our directives.)

623

Identical to the second experiment, we asked participants to discriminate the

624

orientation of targets and then provide confidence judgments. Mask latency was

625

fixed to 55ms. Moreover, we used the QUEST staircase procedure to titrate task

626

performance at ~75% accuracy by varying the target’s Michelson contrast values.

627

The initial contrast value was set to .10. Each testing session comprised two parts:

628

a first one aiming to find the accurate contrast thresholds for type 1 performances

629

across all attention conditions, and a second one where we assumed that these

630

performances were stable enough for applying our analyses. Thus, we relied on

631

the first 480 trials of the titration procedure to determine the contrast thresholds for

632

each participant. This process involved 180 unattended trials, 60 stimulus-driven

633

trials, 180 goal-driven trials, and 60 combined attention trials. During this phase,

634

participants were solely required to indicate the orientation of the target. In the

635

second phase, participants were asked to also input their confidence judgments at

636

the end of each trial. In total, for the second phase, participants completed 936

637

unattended trials, 312 stimulus-driven trials, 936 goal-driven trials, and 312

638

combined trials. While we assumed that the titration procedure reached a stable

639

threshold in the first phase, we nonetheless applied the QUEST algorithm

640

throughout the second half of the experiment to safeguard against factors that may

641

influence type 1 performance.

642
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643

Results

644

Objective performance (type 1 response) in experiment 3. We evaluated the

645

reliability of our titration procedure across attention conditions by estimating

646

perceptual sensitivity d’ for each participant in each attention condition

647

(Supplementary Figure 6). Again, we used hierarchical linear regression models.

648

While the titration procedure properly controlled performance for stimulus-driven

649

orienting, we observed a small benefit for goal-driven orienting over perceptual

650

sensitivity (Supplementary Figure 6; Tables 7 and 8 in supplementary material; β

651

= 0.39, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [0.24, 0.53]). Conversely, we observed no effect of

652

attention on the decision criterion (Supplementary Figure 6 and Table 9 in

653

supplementary material). The QUEST algorithm was therefore unable to perfectly

654

match performances across all attention conditions. This outcome likely follows

655

from the demanding experimental context comprising the combination of a double

656

cueing strategy with visual masking during a target discrimination task.

657

Nevertheless, the titration procedure eliminated the influence of stimulus-driven

658

orienting on perceptual sensitivity, and strongly curtailed the effects of goal-driven

659

orienting paving the way for the application of type 2 SDT to subjective judgments.

660
661

Subjective judgments (type 2 response) for experiment 3. The current results

662

replicate those of experiment 1 and 2. Experimentally controlling for task

663

performance across attention yielded the same pattern. Again, visual assessment

664

of MCMC chains and the Gelman-Rubin diagnostic (i.e., R-Hat < 1.1) confirmed

665

convergence of the models across all parameter estimates (see supplementary

666

Figure 7). Likewise, the DIC only varied marginally across models (Figure 4),

667

thereby conveying that more complex models hardly improved the fit compared to

668

the baseline model. These results replicate our previous findings and verify the

669

lack of influence of stimulus- and goal-driven orienting over the M-Ratio. In

670

particular, the 95% HDI of the posterior densities for the betas of the full models

671

revealed that participants displayed a marginal gain in type 2 efficiency beyond

672

task performance during the unattended condition (μ of β0 = 1.19, 95% HDI [1.07

673

1.32]), while the model indicates that stimulus-driven and goal-driven again failed
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674

to heighten the M-Ratio (μ of β1[Stimulus-Driven Cue Validity] = -.047, 95% HDI [-

675

.226 .136]; μ of β2[Goal-Driven Cue Validity] = .061, 95% HDI [-.112 .237]).

676

Likewise, their interaction was also obviously statistically unreliable ( μ of

677

β3[Stimulus-Driven Cue Validity X Goal-Driven Cue Validity] = .018, 95% HDI [-

678

.244 .283]). The third experiment therefore replicates our previous results and

679

verifies the limited influence of visuospatial attention on confidence reports. Visual

680

inspection of the projected M-Ratio values (Figure 4) confirm this assessment,

681

where we see the absence of attention modulation.

Figure 4. Type 2 signal detection analysis for subjective judgments in Experiment 3 A. Averaged values
for estimated individual values for type 2 responses efficiency (i.e., M-Ratio) from MCMC modelling across
stimulus- and goal-driven cueing through 22ms and 55ms mask latencies. Error bars represent bootstrapped
95% C.I. B. Deviance information criterion that corresponds to the four linear regression models that were
fitted to the data to estimate M-Ratio from Experiments 3 as a function of stimulus- and goal-driven orienting.
C. Posterior densities for parameter estimates of the full linear regression model for predicting type 2
responses efficiency (i.e., M-Ratio). The dotted lines represent 95% HDI.

682

The same pattern emerged for type 2 criteria, where we similarly observed no

683

influence of attention (see supplementary Figure 8).

684

indicates how relative blindsight may lead to inflated type 2 efficiency – a caveat

685

that hinders this experimental approach (Rahnev & Fleming, 2019). However, we

686

did not observe any such pattern here across attention conditions.

Note that recent report

687
688

Thus far, our results support the modular view of visuospatial attention at

689

the level of perceptual sensitivity, yet also highlight the limited influence of
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690

stimulus- and goal-driven orienting at subjective level of perception. Through all

691

attention conditions, type 2 sensitivity equated type 1 sensitivity – a pattern

692

suggesting that the loci of these attention systems are restricted to early

693

processing of perceptual evidence, which in turn determines the emergence of

694

perceptual information at the subjective level. Both stimulus- and goal-driven

695

orienting therefore influence conscious perception and metacognition in a parallel

696

and indirect fashion. In contrast, however, the current body of findings provides

697

little information concerning the decision bound. This lacuna contrasts with

698

previous work that emphasizes the impact of spatial attention over this component

699

(Hawkins et al., 1990; Luo & Maunsell, 2018; Rahnev et al., 2011). We accordingly

700

examined the modularity of attention within the context of target detection

701

paradigm to evaluate the joint and isolated influence of stimulus- and goal-driven

702

orienting over the decision bound. This parameter of the SDT model informs

703

current views on the threshold of target awareness (Jachs et al., 2015). In

704

particular, the decision bound reflects an internal bias relative to the amount of

705

evidence required for committing to the occurrence of the signal. This parameter

706

therefore denotes whether individuals adopt more liberal or conservative stances

707

with respect to the decision process and the perceptual evidence available. While

708

a liberal tendency shows a propensity for committing to the presence of the signal

709

with limited evidence, a conservative tendency instead reflects a propensity to

710

require more evidence before making such commitments. Hence, in addition to

711

perceptual sensitivity, visuospatial orienting may also induce heightened

712

tendencies to report awareness of target, which would account for previous reports

713

of elevated conscious perception as a function of attention (e.g., Hsu et al., 2011).

714
715

Experiment 4

716

Method

717

Participants. We recruited 44 participants for the fourth experiment. They received

718

a monetary compensation of $10/hour for one two-hour session of 1728 trials (i.e.,

719

648 unattended trials, 216 stimulus-driven cueing trials, 648 goal-driven cueing

28

720

trials, 216 combined cueing trials). Participants completed a series of 10 practice

721

trials until they understood the task.

722
723

Again, we relied on previous research (Chica et al., 2014) and G*Power3 to assess

724

the sample size following estimates for repeated measures F-tests on cueing

725

effects for response times in the context of target detection tasks. For a central

726

predictive cue at long cue-target latencies (i.e., > 500ms), we required a sample of

727

9 participants to achieve a power of .8 based on a large effect size (η2 = .23) and

728

an alpha value of .05. For a peripheral non-predictive cue at short cue-target

729

latencies (i.e., < 300ms), we needed 5 participants to attain a power of .8 based

730

on the rather large effect size (η2 = .44) at an alpha level of .05.

731
732

Six participants were excluded due to poor accuracy (< 50%) and high number of

733

trials without a response (> 15%). 38 participants (26 adult females; age: M = 21.61

734

y.o, SD = 3.46) were kept.

735
736

Apparatus and Stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were similar to the previous

737

experiments, except for the following differences (Figure 1). The purpose of this

738

fourth installment was to evaluate the effect of stimulus-driven and goal-driven

739

attention on target detection. We relied on the QUEST algorithm to avoid ceiling

740

and floor effects. Again, this algorithm titrates the Michelson contrast value of the

741

Gabor target as a function of detection performance in the unattended condition

742

so that participants would perform at approximately 70% accuracy in that

743

experimental condition. The calibration procedure allowed stimulus- and goal-

744

driven orienting to facilitate perception while avoiding ceiling effects.

745
746

Design & Procedure. The design and procedure were similar to previous

747

experiments, as we kept validity of the peripheral cue at chance level (i.e., 25%)

748

and the central number cue at 50%. Again, our instructions to participants

749

emphasized the need to use the central number cue, and forthcoming analyses

750

confirm their compliance with our directives. Critically, we employed a target
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751

detection task instead of a target discrimination task. The target was present for

752

half of the trials and participants were informed of this contingency. We asked them

753

to indicate whether a target event had occurred at a probed location. We kept the

754

masking latency to 55ms and used the QUEST staircase procedure throughout the

755

experiment to titrate task performance in the unattended condition at ~70%

756

detection accuracy by varying the target’s Michelson contrast values. We used this

757

titration procedure to avoid floor and ceiling effects following attention orienting.

758

The initial value was set to .10, while the mean contrast value during the task was

759

.38 (SD = .26). For data analysis, we removed the first block of trials (i.e., 144

760

trials) for each participant to allow the QUEST algorithm to stabilize properly and

761

reach dependable contrast values. Combining spatial cueing with a target

762

detection task is challenging due to the difficulty of categorizing target absent trial

763

relative to attention conditions – i.e., in the absence of a target event one cannot

764

determine cue validity. We overcame this issue by matching the contingencies of

765

the cues to the probing of a particular location following the mask onset on each

766

trial. In this way, the location of the probe determined cue validity. Hence, we would

767

probe the location of the stimulus-driven attention cue 25% of the time (i.e.,

768

chance-level non-predictive cueing), and the location of the goal-driven cue 50%

769

of the time (i.e., predictive cueing). Also, note that the target event, which was

770

present for only half of the trials, and could only occur at the probed location.

771

Participants were aware of these specificities. Given that the probe conveyed no

772

information about the likelihood of a target event across our experimental

773

conditions, the effects of attention were orthogonal to the probing procedure. One

774

of the four masks would turn red (i.e., RGB values of 255, 0, 0; 37.7 cd/m2) after

775

198ms and served as the probe. Participants were then required to indicate

776

whether the target stimulus was present or absent as quickly and accurately as

777

possible following its onset.

778
779

Detection Response - Signal Detection Theory. We used signal detection theory

780

to assess detection performance. We calculated perceptual sensitivity d’ and

781

decision criterion C. We applied the following correction ((2*N)-1)/(2*N), where N
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782

equals the number of trials, whenever hit rate was equal to 1; and 1/(2*N)

783

whenever false alarm was equal to 0. Less than 2% of cells required such

784

corrections.

785
786

Results

787

Objective performance (type 1 detection response) in experiment 4. Unexpectedly

788

with respect to our hypotheses, the current analysis reveals that only goal-driven

789

attention benefited perceptual sensitivity (Figure 5). This outcome contrasts with

790

previous literature in that stimulus-driven orienting did not boost perceptual

791

evidence. Hierarchical linear regression models validated this observation (see

792

Tables 10 and 11 in supplementary material; Marginal R2GLMM = .02), wherein goal-

793

driven cue validity was the sole predictor (β = 0.29, SE = 0.07, 95% CI [0.15, 0.44]).

794

Bayes factor analysis confirmed this pattern by providing positive evidence for the

795

null hypothesis regarding stimulus-driven orienting, BF01 = 12. This unexpected

796

result suggests that the influence of stimulus-driven over perceptual evidence

797

might be limited in the context of signal detection whenever goal-driven is also

798

engaged. Conversely, however, we found that both systems influenced the

799

decision criterion, and both contributed to a reduction in conservative tendencies

800

(Figure 5). The best fitting model (see Tables 12 and 13 in supplementary material;

801

Marginal R2GLMM = .25) confirmed this by showing that both stimulus-driven (β = -

802

0.77, SE = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.94, -0.6]) and goal-driven cue validity (β = -0.29, SE =

803

0.09, 95% CI [-0.46, -0.12]) were reliable predictors. Hence, both forms of orienting

804

lessened response biases. Critically, our analyses were again consistent with the

805

modular view of visuospatial attention. While both stimulus- and goal-driven

806

orienting altered the criterion, our analysis shows limited interaction between them.

807

Here, the full model comprising the interaction parameter did not improve the fit (χ 2

808

(1) = .004, p = .95; Figure 5). Bayes factor analysis provided further support for

809

this view by favoring the null hypothesis relative to the interaction model, BF01 =

810

12.3. In sum, both stimulus- and goal-driven attention alter response biases in a

811

parallel manner. Here, we observed that participants adopt a conservative stance
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812

relative to the detection of target events at unattended locations, while both forms

813

of orienting reduced this particular bias independently of each other.

814
815

Response times for detection response. We examined response times (RTs) from

816

the onset of the probe to confirm the reliability of the cueing procedure over

817

performance in the context of target detection. This analysis aimed to ensure that

818

each cue produced facilitation. Here, different patterns of RTs emerged across

819

attention conditions as a function of the target’s contingency (i.e., present or

820

absent). We accordingly evaluated the effects of attention separately for target

821

present and target absent trials (see Figure 5). We used median reaction times of

822

accurate trials (i.e., hits and correct rejections only) and once again applied

823

hierarchical linear regression model in a stepwise fashion by including stimulus-

824

driven attention cue validity, goal-driven attention cue validity, and their interaction

825

as fixed factors, and participants as a random factor. For correct rejections, we

826

observed a small effect of stimulus-driven attention (see Tables 14 and 15 in

827

supplementary material; Marginal R2GLMM = .004), wherein the main effect of

828

stimulus-driven cue validity produced faster response times (β = -17.62, SE = 6.98,

829

95% CI [-31.35, -3.9]). However, this effect is not statistically significant when we

830

fit the full model (Figure 5), which suggests that the influence of stimulus-driven

831

attention remains somewhat marginal in the context of target absent trials. A

832

different pattern emerged for hits (i.e., target present). Here, the best fitting model

833

(see Table 15 and 16 in supplementary material; Marginal R2GLMM = .09) revealed

834

facilitations for response times across both stimulus-driven (β = -48.39, SE =

835

10.04, 95% CI [-68.06, -28.72]) and goal-driven attention (β = -49.77, SE = 10.04,

836

95% CI [-69.44, -30.09]), which corroborates the validity of the double cueing

837

procedure in the context of target detection. Participants were therefore faster to

838

respond as a function of cue validity in both attention conditions. Importantly, the

839

full model did not improve the fit (χ2(1) < .3), thus providing further evidence for

840

parallel processing between stimulus-driven and goal-driven attention in this

841

particular experimental context (Figure 5). Bayes factor analysis supported this

842

construal, as evidence backed the null hypothesis (i.e., best fitting model) with
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843

respect to the interaction model (i.e., best fitting model and the interaction), BF 01 =

844

11.02. These results therefore highlight how some of the effects of attention are

845

contingent to the presence of the target signal. Furthermore, evidence is consistent

846

with our previous findings and shows an additive pattern.

Figure 5. Response time and signal detection analyses in Experiment 4. A. Signal detection perceptual
sensitivity (d’), as well as decision criterion (C) as a function of stimulus- and goal-driven attention. B. median
reaction times for target absent and target present trials as a function stimulus-driven and goal-driven
attention. C. We fitted hierarchical linear regression models to predict perceptual sensitivity (d’) and the
criterion (C) to evaluate the effects of stimulus- and goal-driven attention. Here, we plot fixed effects β
parameters of the full model. Error bars represent 95% CI. D. We fitted hierarchical linear regression models
to predict median response times for target present and target absent to evaluate the effects of stimulus- and
goal-driven attention. Here, we plot fixed effects β parameters of the full model. Error bars represent 95% CI.

847

The unexpected outcome regarding the impotence of stimulus-driven

848

orienting over perceptual sensitivity led us to replicate our findings in a fifth and

849

final experiment. We detail how we replicated the current results in supplementary

850

material. Specifically, this last installment corroborated the absence of an effect for

851

stimulus-driven attention over perceptual sensitivity, as well the modularity of

852

visuospatial attention over response times for hits and over the decision criterion.

853
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854

Discussion

855

Attention is multifaceted, which means that the selection of information

856

comprises multiple components operating alongside each other, including different

857

forms of orienting. Based on this account, the present study examined how the

858

modularity of visuospatial attention modulate several aspects of perception,

859

including

860

metacognition. To this end, we tested the isolated and joint influence of stimulus-

861

and goal-driven attention across type 1 and type 2 SDT using a double cueing

862

approach through multiple installments. Our findings are manifold. Previous work

863

argues that the signal detection theoretic framework corresponds a hierarchical

864

architecture, wherein type 1 SDT reflects to lower-level processes and type 2 SDT

865

higher-order ones (Fleming & Daw, 2017; Maniscalco & Lau, 2016). Assuming the

866

validity of this framework, our findings demonstrate how functional modules of

867

visuospatial attention solely influence lower-level processes, while failing to directly

868

impact higher-order processes. Moreover, both stimulus- and goal-driven orienting

869

boosted perceptual evidence during target discrimination with minimal interaction,

870

thus upholding the modular view at this level of processing. In turn, neither

871

influenced subjective judgments of perception once task performance was factored

872

out, per type 2 SDT analyses and the relative blindsight approach. The current

873

body of results accordingly challenges the notion that visuospatial attention directly

874

interfaces with conscious perception, and instead aligns with previous work that

875

downplays the role of selection in the emergence of consciousness (Brascamp et

876

al., 2010; van Boxtel, 2017; van Boxtel et al., 2010b; Watanabe et al., 2011;

877

Wilimzig et al., 2008; Wyart et al., 2012; Wyart & Tallon-Baudry, 2008). In lieu of a

878

tight relationship, our research implies that visuospatial attention indirectly relates

879

to subjective dimensions of perception through its influence on perceptual

880

sensitivity. In this way, both stimulus- and goal-driven orienting boost visual

881

awareness and metacognition by increasing the amount of evidence available at

882

the perceptual level. We replicated this pattern across several experiments.

883

Likewise, our results support the modular view at the level of the decision bound,

884

where both forms of orienting lessened conservative tendencies independently of

signal

detection

and

discrimination,

visual

awareness,

and

34

885

each other. Because response biases impact subjective reports of conscious

886

perception (Peters et al., 2016), this outcome implies that both stimulus- and goal-

887

driven attention likely influence subjective judgments of perception through this

888

component as well, consistent with previous work (Rahnev et al., 2011). In sum,

889

our findings submit a comprehensive account that limits the scope of visuospatial

890

attention to boosting perceptual evidence and reducing response biases, while

891

evidence corroborated the modular view.

892
893

A large body of research emphasizes the centrality of signal enhancement

894

and noise reduction for the efficient selection of information during perception

895

(Carrasco et al., 2000; Dosher & Lu, 2000a, 2000b; Hawkins et al., 1990; Hillyard

896

et al., 1998; Lu & Dosher, 1998; Lu et al., 2002; Luck, 1995; Luck et al., 1997; Luck

897

et al., 2000). Hence, both mechanisms likely shape the influence of stimulus- and

898

goal-driven on conscious perception via lower-level processing. Consistent with

899

this hypothesis, previous work in electroencephalography relates early sensory

900

gains to visual awareness (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2010), while other reports relate

901

confidence judgments to the amount evidence available during perceptual

902

decisions, as opposed to the relative amount of signal to the noise (Koizumi et al.,

903

2015; Samaha et al., 2016; Zylberberg et al., 2012). These findings support the

904

notion that visuospatial orienting contributes to changing conscious perception

905

through signal enhancement (Carrasco et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2009). Conversely,

906

the influence of noise reduction mechanisms on subjective judgements of

907

perception seems more limited (Vernet et al., 2019). Altogether, previous studies

908

suggest that stimulus- and goal-driven orienting alter reports of awareness and

909

confidence by boosting the amount of sensory evidence available at the perceptual

910

level of processing. In the present work, this benefit transpired as increased

911

discrimination sensitivity (i.e., type 1 sensitivity) in our different experiments, which

912

then resulted in greater awareness and metacognitive sensitivity (i.e., type 2

913

sensitivity). Furthermore, because both forms of orienting contribute to this sensory

914

outcome in parallel, the modular view promotes the idea that the attentional route

915

to conscious perception is multifaceted.
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916
917

The SDT framework defines the criterion parameter as the amount of

918

evidence that underlies perceptual decisions for reporting the presence of a

919

particular signal (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Accordingly, this item estimates

920

response biases, which ultimately relates to the subjective appraisal of individuals

921

(Peters et al., 2016). In this way, two individuals may show the same degree of

922

perceptual sensitivity, yet report different experiences following such biases.

923

Several factors dictate how the perceptual system establishes this threshold,

924

including spatial attention (Chica et al., 2011; Downing, 1988; Hawkins et al., 1990;

925

Luo & Maunsell, 2018; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Rahnev et al., 2011; Sridharan et

926

al., 2017). Consistent with this previous work, the current study indicates that while

927

individuals were inclined to adopt a conservative stance whenever we probed at

928

unattended locations, stimulus- and goal-driven orienting mitigated this bias

929

independently of each other. These findings further expand our framework by

930

showing that, in addition to improving the signal-to-noise ratio in the context of

931

discrimination, both forms of orienting impact how the perceptual system sets the

932

decision bound. Previous work relates changes in criterion setting during

933

perception to variations in neuronal excitability, as indexed by the power of alpha

934

oscillations in the posterior region of the brain (Iemi & Busch, 2018; Iemi et al.,

935

2017; Kloosterman et al., 2019). Given that spatial attention induces relative

936

changes in alpha waves across sensory regions (Foxe & Snyder, 2011), attending

937

to a particular hemifield likely influences the criterion by increasing overall neuronal

938

excitability in the contralateral sensory cortex.

939
940

Our results contrast with the findings from a previous study showing that

941

attention induces conservative shifts of the criterion, as opposed to the liberal one

942

we observe in the present work (Rahnev et al., 2011). According to the authors of

943

this previous report, their results are consistent with the idea that individuals adopt

944

a unified decision bound across attention conditions (Gorea & Sagi, 2001), while

945

attention decreases trial-by-trial variance of the perceptual signal. This pattern

946

ultimately leads to a reduction of false alarm rates, thereby producing a
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947

conservative pattern in the perceptual decision process. Importantly, this

948

interpretation entails that the criterion is not dynamically adjusted as a function of

949

attention processing. However, note that this previous research occurred in the

950

context of the relative blindsight methodology where noise levels were greater for

951

attended stimuli than for unattended ones so as to allow task performance to be

952

equated across both conditions. One can therefore argue that the conservative

953

stance reported in this work follows from elevated noise levels for attended events

954

(Vernet et al., 2019), although additional experiments in this particular report

955

dispute this interpretation. And yet, recent findings similarly challenge the idea that

956

individuals adopt a fixed decision criterion across different contexts of attention

957

(Denison et al., 2017). This work instead demonstrates that considerations

958

pertaining to the attentional state of individuals influence how they calibrate the

959

decision bound, which essentially means that the criterion is adjusted in a

960

dynamical fashion. In light of this interpretation, evidence from the present study

961

further demonstrates that these dynamical adjustments occur separately following

962

stimulus- and goal-driven orienting. This outcome therefore supports the modular

963

view.

964
965

In contrast to the first and second experiments where stimulus-driven

966

attention improved perceptual sensitivity during target discrimination, we observed

967

no such facilitation following stimulus-driven orienting in the context of target

968

detection. While this outcome might seem unexpected, previous studies report

969

similar findings at low target contrast values (Prinzmetal et al., 2008). In fact, our

970

results align with previous assessments showing that non-predictive peripheral

971

cues hardly improve perceptual sensitivity for signal detection despite reliable

972

cueing effects over response times and the decision criterion (Chica et al., 2011).

973

Perceptual benefits in the context of spatial cueing seem to emerge only when

974

cues are made informative (i.e., predictive) about the target’s possible location,

975

thereby engaging goal-driven control of attention. A possible explanation for the

976

limitations of stimulus-driven attention over target detection is the emergence of

977

inhibition of return (IOR). The engagement and subsequent disengagement of
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978

stimulus-driven attention to a peripheral location typically causes a decrease in

979

performance for target events occurring at this previously attended site, the IOR

980

phenomenon (Klein, 2000). The presence of IOR seems like a reasonable

981

explanation for the absence of perceptual benefits here. In fact, previous work

982

indicates that successive events at the same peripheral location can enhance the

983

potency of this phenomenon (Dukewich & Boehnke, 2008). Given that our

984

experimental approach involves such consecutive events (i.e., peripheral cue,

985

target stimulus on half of the trials, mask stimulus, and finally the probe stimulus),

986

it increases the likelihood of IOR. However, note that our findings show a cueing

987

effect over response times for stimulus-driven orienting following the presence of

988

target events, which weakens this interpretation. Ultimately, this particular outcome

989

provides additional support to the idea that stimulus- and goal-driven orienting

990

operate differently: While the latter produced perceptual benefits for both signal

991

discrimination and detection, the former was only reliable over discrimination

992

sensitivity. The absence of benefits following stimulus-driven attention for target

993

detection therefore demonstrates that both forms of orienting are not bounded by

994

the same parameters. This perspective aligns with previous work that emphasizes

995

distinct selection mechanisms for stimulus- and goal-driven attention (Dosher &

996

Lu, 2000a, 2000b; He et al., 1996; Lu & Dosher, 1998).

997
998

One might argue that our results can be explained through a unitary process

999

of attention, such that the absence of an interaction would in fact reflect the

1000

outcome of a single process engaged by both cues. However, several points

1001

undermine this competing account. First, the list of qualitative differences that

1002

characterize the dichotomous view of spatial attention dispute the idea that single

1003

all-encompassing orienting system underlies both forms of orienting (Chica et al.,

1004

2013). Furthermore, our experimental design and cueing strategies rest on a

1005

dense literature that emphasizes how different patterns arise from stimulus- and

1006

goal-driven cueing (Chica et al., 2014). A unique system account therefore runs

1007

counter to a broad body of research. In particular, the idea that goal-driven

1008

attention might be engaged by both cues seems implausible because it would

38

1009

entail that the deployment of this alleged unitary goal-driven process occurs at

1010

multiple locations while incurring minimal cost. Furthermore, the short cue-target

1011

latency for peripheral onset (i.e., from 99ms to 297ms) would hardly leave enough

1012

time for the concurrent re-deployment of goal-driven attention on trials where both

1013

cues indicate separate locations. Evidence for this possibility remains contentious

1014

(Jans et al., 2010; however, see Eimer & Grubert, 2014). The current findings

1015

therefore seem nearly impossible to reconcile with a unitary process account.

1016
1017

One smaller challenge to the interpretation of the current results concerns

1018

our usage of number cues, whereby previous reports show that this form of cueing

1019

includes some form of automatic and overlearned orienting responses due to

1020

associations between numeral knowledge and the spatial organization of clocks

1021

(Ristic et al., 2006). Our cueing methodology could therefore have introduced

1022

some form of combined cueing responses that would comprise both goal-driven

1023

and automatic orienting, as opposed to a pure form of goal-driven orienting (Ristic

1024

& Kingstone, 2006; Ristic & Landry, 2015). Note, however, that research on

1025

number cues also uncovered similar effects for the number line where lower values

1026

(e.g., the number “3”) facilitate left orienting and higher ones (e.g., the number “9”)

1027

right orienting. Certain numbers (e.g., the number “3”) could therefore ignite

1028

opposing automatic responses depending on whether the overlearned component

1029

here reflects numerical knowledge relative to clocks (i.e., automatic orienting to the

1030

right) or the number line (i.e., automatic orienting to the left. Task set and higher-

1031

order processes likely mediate between these conflicting processes (Egner &

1032

Hirsch, 2005). Nevertheless, our results are consistent with previous findings in

1033

showing that this potential combined effect of goal-driven orienting and

1034

automaticity remains largely independent of stimulus-driven orienting responses

1035

(Ristic & Kingstone, 2012; Ristic et al., 2012). Another possible limitation concerns

1036

the usage of a binary scale for subjective reports when, perhaps, a four options

1037

scale would provide a better resolution to uncover the effect of attention on

1038

subjective judgments of perception (Sandberg et al., 2010). Here, we relied on a

1039

binary scale to ease task difficulty for participants and allow them to perform it at a

39

1040

higher tempo. Each session was already tedious, therefore going from a two

1041

options objective response to a four options subjective scale would have slowed

1042

them down significantly.

1043
1044

Lastly, the fact that our explanation rests on null hypotheses regarding the

1045

interaction of stimulus- and goal-driven orienting for type 1 responses and the

1046

absence of an attention effect for type 2 responses raises the prospect of a type II

1047

error (Dienes, 2014; Gallistel, 2009; Wagenmakers, 2007). However, our

1048

experimental approach mitigates these concerns through different means. First,

1049

we confirmed the validity of the cueing procedure for engaging both forms of

1050

orienting. In fact, we report facilitation for both stimulus- and goal-driven orienting

1051

for at least one estimate in all of our experiments. Thus, null findings do not follow

1052

from the absence of an effect of stimulus- and goal-driven orienting on perception.

1053

Second, we replicated each finding across different installments of our

1054

methodology. Third, we relied on Bayesian statistics to support null hypotheses

1055

(Dienes, 2014). Considered together, these different steps make it unlikely that our

1056

interpretation is invalid due to type II error.

1057
1058

Conclusion

1059

The current study investigated the multifaceted view of attention through

1060

type 1 and type 2 SDT. Relying on the double cueing approach to concurrently

1061

engage stimulus- and goal-driven orienting, our findings support the modularity of

1062

visuospatial attention. In particular, our study shows that both systems modulate

1063

perceptual evidence and the decision criterion independently from one another.

1064

Conversely, we found little evidence that attention directly interfaces with the

1065

subjective dimensions of perception. Accordingly, the dynamics between

1066

visuospatial attention and human consciousness appear to rest on indirect

1067

connections, which complicates the story. Our research therefore provides a

1068

comprehensive account that opens new research avenues for exploring the
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various points of contact between the components of attention and perception.
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